Syllabus

Course Meeting Times

Lectures: 1 session / week, 3 hours / session

Course Overview

Propositions are everywhere in the philosophy of mind. Believing, hoping, and intending (for example) are said to be "propositional attitudes", mental states that involve relations to propositions. If knowing is a mental state, then that is a propositional attitude too. A currently popular view holds that perceptual states are also propositional attitudes, relating the subject to propositions about her environment; a version of this view holds that the phenomenal character of experience is explained by these environmental propositions. Another popular view holds that knowing how is a propositional attitude, the familiar attitude of knowing to a distinctive kind of practical proposition. And one familiar diagnosis of black-and-white Mary's predicament is that while imprisoned she fails to know a distinctive kind of phenomenal proposition. If the world is the totality of facts, and facts are true propositions, then views that emphasize the importance of propositional attitudes offer an appealing vision of the connection between mind and world.

On the other hand, some maintain that propositions play a less fundamental role. The phenomenon of the "essential indexical" is often supposed to show that propositions are not the objects of "de se" attitudes, as when I realize that I am the messy shopper. Another kind of content is needed, often modeled as sets of "centered worlds": These new-fangled contents have been employed elsewhere, for instance in theories of perception. Other quite different ways of relegating propositions to the background in the philosophy of perception are to maintain either that perception has "nonconceptual" content, or that perception puts the subject in touch with facts (taken to be items other than true propositions) or (alternatively) truth makers. And of course there is a lively controversy about the relevance of propositions to knowing-how and the knowledge argument.

The seminar will examine issues at the heart of the dispute between the proposition-aficionados and their detractors. Although we will get pretty deep into the weeds fairly quickly, this is a survey seminar, and no previous acquaintance with the central texts will be presumed. The seminar will be divided into five parts, covering: (1) de se thought; (2) propositions; (3) knowing how; (4) perceptual content; (5) the knowledge argument.

Prerequisites

MIT students were required to obtain permission from the instructors.

Requirements

• Class attendance
• Assigned readings
• A 20–25 page final paper with a 20 minute presentation

Calendar