Texts
The following book will provide the main framework for the class:
Resnik, Michael. Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. ISBN: 9780816614400.
This will be supplemented with material that will be made available, as we go, including readings from five other books:
Jeffrey, Richard. The Logic of Decision. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780226395821.
Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. ISBN: 9780674840317.
Joyce, James M. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN: 9780521641647.
Leyton-Brown, Kevin, and Yoav Shoham. Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction. San Rafael, CA: Morgan and Claypool Publishers, 2008. ISBN: 9781598295931.
Sen, Amartya K. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. ISBN: 9780262192149.
Readings
SES # | TOPICS | READINGS |
---|---|---|
1 | Introduction: What is rationality? | |
I. Individual decision theory | ||
2-10 | Preference, ignorance and risk | Resnik, chapters 1-3 |
Probability – subjective and objective | Jeffrey, chapters 1-5 | |
Utility and value |
Resnik, chapter 4 Sen, Amartya K. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory." Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977): 317-344. Reprinted as chapter 4 in: Sen, Amartya K. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. ISBN: 9780262192149. | |
Causal decision theory |
Lewis, David. "Causal Decision Theory." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59, no. 1 (March 1981): 5-30. For those who want to explore causal decision theory in more depth, see Joyce, especially chapters 2-5. | |
II. Game theory | ||
11-19 | The basic framework |
Resnik, chapter 5 Notes on games and models (PDF) |
Nash Equilibrium and other solution concepts | Leyton-Brown and Shoham, chapters 1-5 | |
Game theory and individual decision theory | ||
Coordination games, bargaining and negotiation | Schelling, chapters 4-5 | |
III. Theory of collective choice | ||
20-26 | Defining social value in terms of individual value | Resnik, chapter 6 |
Arrow's theorem, and other impossibility results |
Sen, Amartya K. "Rationality and Social Choice." The American Economic Review 85, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-24. Gibbard, Allan. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result." Econometrica 41, no. 4 (July 1973): 587-601. | |
Interpersonal comparisons of utility | Sen, chapter 12 |