The actual size of these slides is 12.8 cm by 9.6 cm. Use Adobe Reader's print options to scale the slide to fit the page before printing.
SES # | TOPICS | SLIDES |
---|---|---|
1 | Introduction to economic, social, and communication networks | Lecture 1 (PDF - 1.0MB) |
2 |
Graph theory and social networksDirected and undirected graphs, paths, cycles, diameter, clustering, bipartite graphs. Applications: the web as a directed graph, graphical representation of homophily | Lecture 2 (PDF) |
3-4 |
Branching processes and random graph modelsReview of branching processes, Erdös-Renyi graphs, degree distributions, phase transitions, connectedness, and giant component. Applications: tipping, six degrees of separation, and disease transmissions |
Lecture 3 (PDF) Lecture 4 (PDF) |
5-7 |
Rich get richer phenomena, power laws, and small worldsPreferential attachment, degree distributions, generalized random graphs, and clustering. Applications: firm size distributions, link analysis and web search, PageRank, decentralized search, and navigation |
Lecture 5 (PDF) Lecture 6 (PDF) Lecture 7 (PDF) |
8 |
Epidemics and diffusion through networksSIR (susceptible, infected, removed) and SIS (susceptible, infected susceptible) models of diffusion. Applications: spread of information and disease, and genetic inheritance | Lecture 8 (PDF) |
9-11 |
Introduction to game theoryGames, strategies, payoffs, extensive and normal forms, and Nash equilibrium. Applications: tragedy of the commons and coordination games |
Lecture 9 (PDF) Lecture 10 (PDF) Lecture 11 (PDF) |
12 |
Applications of game theory to networksModeling network traffic, strategic network formation, negative externalities, Braess' paradox, and potential games. Application: congestion tax in London | Lecture 12 (PDF) |
13-14 |
Evolution, learning, and myopia vs. rationalityEvolutionary stable strategies, fictitious play, emergence of Nash equilibrium from rules of thumb, limits of myopic behavior. Application: rules of thumb in traffic | Lectures 13 and 14 (PDF) |
15-16 |
Dynamic and repeated games, and cooperation and trust in networksSubgame perfect Nash equilibrium, repeated games, prisoners' dilemma, repeated games over networks. Application: emergence of cooperation in social networks |
Lecture 15 (PDF) Lecture 16 (PDF) |
17-18 |
Network effects, innovation, tipping and contagionPositive externalities, strategic complements, path dependence, diffusion of innovation, and tipping in technology, financial, and product markets. Application: the rise of Microsoft and contagion phenomena | Lectures 17 and 18 (PDF) |
19-21 |
Games of incomplete informationBayes rule, Bayesian Nash equilibria, first and second price auctions, and introduction to social learning. Applications: spectrum auctions, market for lemons, and keyword-based advertising | Lectures 19 to 21 (PDF) |
22-23 |
Social learning in networksBayesian learning, benefits of copying, herd behavior, informational cascades. Applications: consumer behavior and financial markets | Lectures 22 and 23 (PDF) |
24 |
Decisions in groupsDecision making in organizations and societies, social choice, Condorcet jury theorem, and political economy. Application: committee decisions | Lecture 24 (PDF) |