Syllabus

Course Meeting Times

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session

Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session

Course Overview

This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.

Textbooks and Readings

In addition to the textbooks listed below, there will be readings from various journals to supplement the texts.

Primary Texts

Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.

Osborne, Martin, and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. ISBN: 9780262650403.

Supplementary Texts

Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN: 9780195300796.

Weibull, Jorgen. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780262731218.

Fudenberg, Drew, and David Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780262061940.

Grading

There will be 5 problem sets due throughout the semester, as well as a take-home exam during the final exam week. Students have 24 hours to complete and return the exam.

Calendar