

Problems for Carlson 1977 Part 2: Belladonas, Typhoons and beyond.

Belladonas

Recall:

- Claim: singular indefinites can have both wide and narrow scope with respect to attitude verbs; Bare Plurals can only have narrow scope.

1) John wants to meet a doctor.

De re: describes a desire to meet a particular doctor. $\exists > \mathbf{want}$.

De dicto: describes a desire that could be satisfied by meeting any doctor. $\mathbf{Want} > \exists$

2) John wants to meet doctors

Only *de dicto* interpretation.

- In Carlson's theory, existential uses of BPs can only have the narrow scope reading because the existential quantifier is introduced by the embedded predicate.

Assuming overt quantification over worlds in the object language (not what Carlson does!):

3) John_i [1 [wants [PRO_i to meet doctors]]]

4) $T(\mathbf{want}) = \lambda p \lambda x \lambda w \forall w' (\text{Boul}_x(w)(w') \rightarrow p(w'))$ [simplified]

$\{w' : \text{Boul}_x(w)(w')\}$ is the set of worlds that are compatible with what x wants in w.

5) $T(\mathbf{meet}) = \lambda x_i \lambda y_j \lambda w \exists z_s (R(z)(x)(w) \& \exists r_s (R(r)(y)(w) \& \text{meet}'(r)(z)(w)))$

[note: realization relation relativized to worlds: $R(z)(x)(w)$ – “z realizes x in w”.]

6) $T(\mathbf{John}) = j$

7) $T(\mathbf{doctors}) = d$

8) $\lambda w \forall w' (\text{Boul}_j(w)(w') \rightarrow \exists x (R(x)(d)(w') \& \exists y (R(y)(j)(w') \& \text{meet}'(y)(x)(w'))))$

The formula in (8) doesn't entail that John wants to meet a particular group of doctors.

- Anaphora:

9) John wants to meet doctors. They are interesting.

10) John wants to meet doctors. Doctors are interesting.

11) John wants to meet a doctor. He hangs out at the bar next door.

The belladonna-examples (Kratzer 1980, for German)

12) John intentionally put belladonnas in the fruit salad, because he mistook them for cherries.

13) John wanted to put belladonnas in the fruit salad because he mistook them for cherries.

• Scenario 1:

John wanted to put some particular plurality of objects, X, into the fruit salad which were, in fact, belladonnas, and the reason for this was that he mistook those objects for cherries. [if John had known that X was a group of belladonnas, he wouldn't have put X in the salad – he knows that belladonnas are very poisonous.]

• What we get:

14) $\lambda w \forall w' (\text{Boul}_i(w)(w') \rightarrow (\exists X(R(X)(b)(w') \ \& \ \exists y (R(y)(j)(w') \ \& \ \text{put-in-the-salad}' (j)(X)(w'))))$

['X' ranges over pluralities]

Given (14), John's desires will be satisfied as long as he puts some group (or other) of individuals X that he takes to be belladonnas in the salad. This is incompatible with the scenario above.

• What if the \exists quantifier has narrow scope (de dicto interpretation), but **belladonnas** is given a transparent interpretation (see Fodor 1970, 1979 on *de dicto* transparent readings).

15) $\lambda w \forall w' (\text{Boul}_i(w)(w') \rightarrow (\exists X(R(X)(b)(\underline{w}) \ \& \ \exists y (R(y)(j)(w') \ \& \ \text{put-in-the-salad}' (j)(X)(w'))))$

This is compatible with a situation where:

- (i) John sees a, b, c.
- (ii) a, b and c are actually belladonnas.
- (iii) John doesn't know that a, b and c are belladonnas
- (iv) John wants to put a, b, and c in the salad.

• We still don't get the right interpretation for the pronoun in the *because*-clause:

16) ... because he mistook them for cherries.
... because he mistook belladonnas for cherries.

17) $\lambda w \exists Y(R(Y)(b)(w) \ \& \ \exists y (R(y)(j)(w) \ \& \ \text{mistook-for-cherries}' (y)(Y) (w)))$

Nothing forces the belladonnas that John mistook for cherries to be the same one that he wants to put in the salad.

- We want:
- 18) There's a particular group of actual belladonnas that John wanted to put in the salad because he mistook the particular group of actual belladonnas that he wanted to put in the salad for cherries.

[Irene questions that Kratzer's scenario really corresponds to a different reading. If it doesn't, then the belladonna examples pose no problems for Carlson.]

Carlson 1996:

Singular indefinites and anaphora.

- 19) Wendy intentionally threw a wallet containing her life's savings down the sewer (Carlson 1996)

- 20) Wendy wanted to throw a wallet containing her life's savings down the sewer.

- Sentences like the above "can be read as Wendy wishing to get rid of her life savings, or as a very bad mistake, where for instance, she is vengefully throwing her ex husband's wallet into the sewer, entirely unaware of its contents" (Carlson 1996: 3)

In these cases, a *because*-clause containing a coreferential pronoun does not disambiguate (Carlson 1996: 3)

- 21) Wendy intentionally threw a wallet containing her life's savings down a sewer because she knew her ex-husband would climb in after it (Carlson 1996: 3)

- Both situations described above are compatible with a *de re* interpretation (= there's a particular wallet that Mary wants to throw away). And, in fact, I find a *de dicto* interpretation difficult to get (If we want to convey that Mary's aim was to get rid of her life savings, why mention the wallet?). Let's use the following example instead:

- 22) Mary wants to find a scarf that matches her new dress, because she could wear it at dinner tonight.

- The argument:

The example in (22) has a *de dicto* reading (on which Mary's desires would be satisfied by finding any scarf that matches her new dress) where the pronoun *because*-clause is anaphoric to the indefinite in the main clause.

The *de dicto* reading corresponds to the narrow scope of the \exists quantifier associated with the indefinite.

Hence, we shouldn't take the coreferential pronoun in the belladonnas example as evidence for wide scope \exists quantification.

- But note: the modal **could** is crucial in (22).

- 23) Mary wants to find a scarf that matches her new dress, because her boyfriend gave it to her.

Or:

24) Mary wants to find a scarf that matches her new dress. She would wear it at dinner tonight.

25) Mary wants to find a scarf that matches her new dress. Her boyfriend gave it to her.

- (22) is an instance of modal subordination (Roberts 1987, 1989, 1996).

- Indefinites can serve as antecedents for pronouns in other sentences.

26) A wolf came in. It ate John

- In general, the scope of an indefinite in the scope of an operator is limited to the scope of that operator (see Karttunen 1976, Kamp 1981, Heim 1982).

27) A wolf might come in. * It eats John first.

- But: anaphora becomes possible again if we add a modal in the second sentence [there are requirements on the compatibility of the two modals - see Roberts 1987]

28) A wolf might come in. It would eat you first.

More examples:

29) John doesn't have a car. It **would** be in the garage. (Roberts 1996).

30) John wants to catch a fish. He **intends** to eat it for dinner (Roberts 1996).

31) Alice fears there is a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets. She **hopes** to trap it alive and turn it lose inside. (Roberts 1996)

[This phenomenon is more general:

32) Mary is considering getting her Ph.D. in linguistics. She wouldn't regret attending graduate school. (Roberts 1996)

The second sentence contains a presupposition trigger. The first one contains a clause that satisfies the presupposition but that is embedded under the scope of an operator.]

- Roberts proposes that the indefinites are brought under the scope of a modal by a process of accommodation.

33) If a wolf came in, it would eat you first.
[necessary] [a wolf_i comes in] [it_i eats you first]

34) If John had a car, it would be in the garage.

35) Mary wants to find a scarf that goes with her new dress. She would wear it at the party.

36) If Mary found a scarf that goes with her new dress, she would wear it at the party.

- This analysis is not available in the belladonna examples.

Allegedly vs. Intentionally.

Carlson:

- *Intentionally* and *willingly* entail the truth of its complement. *Allegedly* and *apparently* don't.
- 37) John apparently/allegedly put belladonnas in the fruit salad.
- 38) John intentionally/willingly put belladonnas in the fruit salad.
- 39) John put belladonnas in the fruit salad.
- Different behavior with respect to anaphora:
- 40) Because he mistook them for cherries, John intentionally/willingly put belladonnas in the fruit salad.
- 41) Because he mistook them for cherries, John apparently/allegedly put belladonnas in the fruit salad.
- The only reading of (41) is “the one where there is no necessary token-identity of the items”. (Carlson 1996: 4)
- The token-identity reading of examples like (40) is due to the existential entailment noted above.
 - BUT: *want* doesn't entail the truth of its complement.
- 42) John wanted to put belladonnas in the salad (but he didn't).

Partitives

- 43) John intentionally put several belladonnas/a belladonna in the salad, and not several others/another one in the fruit salad.
- 44) ? John intentionally put belladonnas, and not (several/some) others in the fruit salad.
- “The kinds analysis makes sense of this in that there is no specific de re collection of belladonnas to be a member or not be a member of for the bare plural case (....)” (Carlson 1996: 5).
 - Contrast between **one** and **a**? Relevance of partitivity?

Typhoons

- 45) Typhoons arise in this part of the South Pacific. (Milsark 1974)
- 45) has two readings.
- (i) Typhoons in general arise in this part of the South Pacific.
- (ii) There arise typhoons in this part of the South Pacific.

The only reading predicted by Carlson's account is (i)

46) (G' ([x. arise-in-this-part-of-the-SP(x)])(t))

More examples:

- 47) Unfriendly tribesmen dwell just over those hills. (Carlson 1989)
48) People with links to organized crime support this candidacy. (Schubert & Pelletier 1987)
49) Computers compute the daily weather forecast
(variation on Carlson 1989:8, with sg. indefinite)
50) Cats run across my lawn every day.
(variation on Carlson's 1989: 11)

Generic readings of BPs with stage-level predicates.

Carlson's theory predicts that

- (i) BPs subjects with stage-level predicates will have an existential interpretation.
(ii) BPs subjects with individual-level predicates will have a generic interpretation.

Diesing (1988) presents counterexamples to (i)

- 51) Hospital patients are sick.
52) Raising a baby bird is very difficult. Baby birds are hungry, and have to be fed constantly.
53) People in bars are drunk. (Diesing 1988: 19)

[Wilkinson 1991: Carlson might be able to respond to this by saying that these contexts force the predicates to switch from stage to individual-level, so we aren't really seeing a generic reading of BP subjects with stage-level predicates.]

Diesing 1992:

- 54) Firemen are available
(a) There are firemen available.
(b) It is a characteristic property of firemen that they are available.
(c) Generally, there are firemen available.