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Stable	e Marriage
Preference	5
2 : ABED 3 : DBAE 4 : ADBE 5 : ABDE	
	Albert R Meyer, March 8, 2010 lec 6M.7











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Mating Ritual: girls improve Lemma:

A girl's favorite tomorrow will be at least as desirable as today's.

(*favorite* (G) is weakly increasing for each G)







On Wedding Day

- Each girl has ≤ 1 suitors (by def of wedding day)
- Each boy is married, or has no girls on his list

🔛 Mating Ritual: everyone marries

Everyone is married on wedding day *Proof:* by contradiction.

If B is not married, his list is empty. By Invariant, all girls have favorites better than B -- so they do have a favorite. That is, all girls are married, so all boys are married.

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Mating Ritual: stable marriages

Marriages are Stable: Bob won't be in rogue couple with case 1: a girl G on his final list, since he's already married to the best of them.

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Albert R Meyer, March 8, 20









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